% WARNING: This file may contain UTF-8 (unicode) characters. % While non-8-bit characters are officially unsupported in BibTeX, you % can use them with the biber backend of biblatex % usepackage[backend=biber]{biblatex} @techreport{LaborHubJ8, title = "Cross-Sibling Linkages in the Indian Marriage Market", author = "Guha, Arigna and Keskar, Ajinkya and Mookerjee, Sulagna", institution = "Cornell University ILR School", type = "Discussion Paper", series = "Labor Hub Discussion Paper Series", number = "J8", year = "2026", month = "November", URL = "https://laborhub.ilr.cornell.edu/publications/34/", abstract = {When can unequal spending across children benefit them both? We study this question in the Indian marriage market, where parents allocate scarce dowry resources across daughters who marry sequentially. We model successive marriages as a signalling game: the elder daughter’s match conveys information about the family that affects the marriage terms available to her younger sister. We test the model’s predictions using a survey experiment with 516 parents in Uttar Pradesh. The design elicits perceived returns to a favourable elder match, responses from parents of potential grooms, and willingness to depart from equal spending when both daughters’ marriage outcomes are specified. Holding family resources and elder expenditure fixed, a high-quality elder match raises the younger sister’s perceived probability of obtaining a high-quality groom by 47.8 percentage points compared with a low-quality elder match. Parents of daughters expect the dowry required for this fixed target to fall by Rs. 151,600, nearly twice the Rs. 76,500 reduction in stated requirements reported by parents of potential grooms. When displayed allocation outcomes include a benefit to the younger daughter, parents are 30.4 percentage points more likely to choose spending tilted toward the elder. This response is 11.7 points larger among parents whose earlier answers imply a positive cross-sister return. These findings identify a cross-sister return to marriage investment: a favourable elder match can improve the younger sister’s opportunities and give parents a reason to invest more in the elder’s marriage. This incentive may offset pressures that otherwise disadvantage elder daughters in sequential marriage. More broadly, cross-child returns can rationalize unequal parental spending.}, }