2026-10-30

Minimum Wages and Worker Retention: The Roles of Labour Concentration and Employment Protection

Andy Snell , Enzo Almeida , Pedro Martins , Jonathan P. Thomas

Abstract

We examine how minimum wages affect incumbent workers' retention and how this relationship varies with labour market concentration and employment protection. Using 2002-18 matched employer-employee data from Portugal, we construct worker-year-specific wage bites incorporating both statutory and collectively bargained wage floors. Larger bites are associated with reductions in retention for fixed-term workers but virtually no effects for permanent workers. However, labour concentration attenuates the response for fixed-term workers by approximately 60%. A model of oligopsony with match-specific productivity shocks and firing costs rationalises these patterns: higher concentration leads to larger markdowns which cushion incumbent matches against higher wage floors, while employment protection limits adjustment through separations.

Country of study

Portugal

Research Topic(s)

Minimum wages Market structure Unions and collective bargaining